Epistemology

Moral Skepticisms

Name: Moral Skepticisms
Brand: Oxford University Press
SKU: 9780195187724
Price: 8691.00 INR
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780195187724

MORAL SKEPTICISMS

Contributor(s): Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter Author Format: Hardback

Hardback · ISBN 9780195187724

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Key Specifications

ISBN	9780195187724
Subtitle	MORAL SKEPTICISMS
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Publication date	January 2006
Language	English
MRP	£55.00 GBP
Page count	288
Item weight	128 g

All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how?
These profound questions lead to fundamental issues about the nature of morality, language, metaphysics, justification, and knowledge. They also have tremendous practical importance in handling controversial moral questions in health care ethics, politics, law, and education. Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive overview of these difficult subjects, looking at a wide variety of questions, including: Are any moral beliefs true? Are any justified? What is justified belief? The second half of the book explores various moral theories that have grappled with these issues, such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism, all of which are attempts to answer moral skepticism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that all these approaches fail to rule out moral nihilism--the view that nothing is really morally wrong or right, bad or good. Then he develops his own novel theory, --"moderate Pyrrhonian moral skepticism"--which concludes that some moral beliefs can be justified out of a modest contrast class but no moral beliefs can be justified out of an extreme contrast class. While explaining this original position and criticizing alternatives, Sinnott-Armstrong provides a wide-ranging survey of the epistemology of moral beliefs.

Moral Skepticisms

Key Specifications

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter Author

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