Cover of Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation by Ray, Debraj, ISBN 9780199207954
Economics

Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

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Hardback ยท ISBN 9780199207954

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Key Specifications

ISBN 9780199207954
Publisher OUP Oxford
Publication date November 2007
Language English
MRP ยฃ84.00 GBP
Page count 336
Item weight 143 g
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective?

Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.