Logic

Saving Truth from Paradox

Name: Saving Truth from Paradox
Brand: OUP Oxford
SKU: 9780199230747
Price: 6881.00 INR
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ISBN: 9780199230747

SAVING TRUTH FROM PARADOX

Contributor(s): Field, Hartry Author Format: Paperback

Paperback · ISBN 9780199230747

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Key Specifications

ISBN	9780199230747
Subtitle	SAVING TRUTH FROM PARADOX
Publisher	OUP Oxford
Publication date	May 2008
Language	English
MRP	£48.99 GBP
Page count	424
Item weight	131 g

Saving Truth from Paradox is an ambitious investigation into paradoxes of truth and related issues, with occasional forays into notions such as vagueness, the nature of validity, and the G: odel incompleteness theorems. Hartry Field presents a new approach to the paradoxes and provides a systematic and detailed account of the main competing approaches.

Part One examines Tarski's, Kripke's, and Lukasiewicz's theories of truth, and discusses validity and soundness, and vagueness. Part Two considers a wide range of attempts to resolve the paradoxes within classical logic. In Part Three Field turns to non-classical theories of truth that that restrict excluded middle. He shows that there are theories of this sort in which the conditionals obey many of the classical laws, and that all the semantic paradoxes (not just the simplest ones) can be handled consistently with the naive theory of truth. In Part Four, these theories are extended to the property-theoretic paradoxes and to various other paradoxes, and some issues about the understanding of the notion of validity are addressed. Extended paradoxes, involving the notion of determinate truth, are treated very thoroughly, and a number of different arguments that the theories lead to "revenge problems" are addressed. Finally, Part Five deals with dialetheic approaches to the paradoxes: approaches which, instead of restricting excluded middle, accept certain contradictions but alter classical logic so as to keep them confined to a relatively remote part of the language. Advocates of dialetheic theories have argued them to be better than theories that restrict excluded middle, for instance over issues related to the incompleteness theorems and in avoiding revenge problems. Field argues that dialetheists' claims on behalf of their theories are quite unfounded, and indeed that on some of these issues all current versions of dialetheism do substantially worse than the best theories that restrict excluded middle.

Saving Truth from Paradox

Key Specifications

Field, Hartry Author

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